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Corruption, Income Inequality, and Subsequent Economic Growth
Abstract
This paper attempts to untangle the link between corruption and income inequality with subsequent
economic growth. It uses standard OLS multiple regression analysis and data from 134 countries over a ten
year time frame to test the hypothesis that after controlling for corruption, income inequality will be less
significant in explaining subsequent growth rates. Perhaps it is not income equality that fosters economic
growth, but rather a decrease in corruption that causes both economic growth and greater equality. This study
yields some expected findings in support of well-established variables and concludes that inequality harms
growth even after controlling for corruption.
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I. Introduction 
What makes some countries rich but others poor?  This is a question as old 
as economics itself, dating back to Adam Smith’s 1776 magnum opus, An Inquiry 
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.  However, despite the 
question’s age and importance, it is still relatively open.  Prior research has 
established causal relationships in a large number of different variables; Durlauf 
et al. (2005) identify 145 different variables found to be statistically significant 
for impacting growth in at least one study.  Among the most consistent factors 
positively impacting growth are level of investment, sound money, and openness 
to trade (Levine and Renelt 1992).  Yet, with many African and Latin American 
countries still lagging behind, more recent research has focused on the effect of 
social cohesion on economic growth.  This strand of research examines the effects 
of ethnic diversity, sharing a common language, and especially income inequality1 
on economic growth.  Greater income inequality was first thought to positively 
influence economic growth.  Arthur Okun argued in his influential 1975 book, 
Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff, that income equality is fostered by 
redistributive policies that harm growth2 (“leaky bucket” analogy).  This 
conventional textbook approach posits that income inequality is the result of 
healthy incentives, and thus, inequality is good for growth.  However, the 
majority of subsequent research finds a negative relationship between income 
inequality and subsequent economic growth (Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Persson 
and Tabellini 1994; Perotti 1996; Rodrik 1999; Easterly et al. 2006; Berg et al. 
2012). 
Corruption is another variable consistently found to negatively impact 
growth (Mauro 1995; Mauro 1997; Tanzi 1998; Wei 2000).  The literature on how 
corruption impacts growth and how inequality impacts growth has developed 
largely independently.  However, since corruption is positively correlated with 
inequality (Gupta et al. 2002; Brempong 2002; Brempong and Camacho 2006) 
and negatively correlated with growth (Mauro 1995; Mauro 1997; Tanzi 1998; 
Wei 2000), the effects of income inequality and corruption on subsequent growth 
may not be fully understood independent of one another.  Studies that examine the 
effects of income inequality on subsequent growth but fail to account for 
corruption may suffer from omitted variable bias.  After controlling for 
corruption, income inequality may not influence economic growth as much as 
previous studies have found. 
                                                          
1
 Kuznets (1955) was the first to examine the relationship between economic growth and income 
inequality.  However, Kuznets (1955) focuses on how economic growth impacts income 
inequality while this paper examines how income inequality impacts subsequent economic 
growth. 
2
 Despite the trade-off that Okun identified, he nonetheless supported redistributive policies. 
1
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The purpose of this research is to bridge the gap between income 
inequality and corruption studies by analyzing both variables within the same 
model.  My hypothesis is that after controlling for corruption, income inequality 
will be less significant in explaining subsequent growth rates across countries3.  
Perhaps it is not income equality that brings about economic growth but rather a 
decrease in corruption that causes both economic growth and greater income 
equality. 
This study is organized as follows.  Section II provides a summary of the 
literature on inequality and economic growth as well as corruption and economic 
growth.  Section III details the data used and statistical techniques performed.  
Section IV discloses the findings of this study followed by key observations.  
Section V concludes with an interpretation of the findings, policy implications, 
and recommendations for future work. 
                
II. Literature Review 
 Although one of the oldest areas in economic research, development 
economics still has many questions left unanswered or only partially answered.  
There have been a wide range of studies examining the determinants of economic 
growth using a variety of explanatory variables, control variables, and statistical 
techniques.  A common problem throughout this broad body of literature is the 
difficulty in performing empirical analysis.  The difficulty is brought about by 
poor data, small sample sizes, omitted variable bias, and endogeneity.  Poor 
countries, especially those with corrupt governments, often do not have reliable 
data.  Additionally, surveys attempting to measure the same variable may vary 
greatly across different countries (Deininger and Squire 1996).  With small 
sample sizes and 145 variables found statistically significant for impacting growth 
(Durlauf et al. 2005), there is bound to be omitted variable bias.  With the number 
of explanatory variables approaching the total number of countries in the world, 
no model could include anywhere close to all of the important variables.  Even in 
models that account for several important variables, there is still the problem of 
endogeneity.  Many variables in the development literature both influence 
economic growth and are influenced by it4.  Despite the difficulties with empirical 
work, some variables, such as income inequality and corruption, have been 
consistent across a wide variety of studies. 
                                                          
3
 In statistical terms, if corruption is omitted from the growth model, this may generate a negative 
bias on the estimated income inequality coefficient.  The coefficient on income inequality may 
appear more negative when corruption is excluded from the model. 
4
 For example, lower levels of corruption may foster growth, but growth may also cause 
corruption to decrease.  Additionally, the level of income inequality may impact growth, but 
growth may also impact income inequality (Kuznets 1955).   These problems will be addressed 
more thoroughly in the methodology section. 
2
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Studies examining how initial inequality5 impacts economic growth differ 
in both their methodology and their conclusions.  Inequality is theorized to impact 
growth through three main channels: redistribution, weaker institutions handling 
external shocks6 poorly, and credit market imperfections.  Sachs (1989) theorizes 
that high income inequality in Latin American countries led to political pressure 
for redistributive policies to raise the incomes of lower income groups.  These 
attempts at redistribution contribute to poor policy and thus weaker economic 
performance.  Unlike Sachs (1989), Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and 
Tabellini (1994) develop formal models based on the median voter theory, and 
then test their models empirically.  Both models start with the assumption that 
people with more capital prefer lower tax rates since those with capital own the 
means of production and benefit from economic growth that is fostered from low 
tax rates.  However, those with labor income prefer higher taxes as some of the 
tax revenue is redistributed from capital owners to those with labor income.  A 
pure capitalist prefers a tax rate that maximizes growth while those with labor 
income prefer a tax rate that exceeds the ideal tax rate for growth.  Inequality is 
defined by how poor the median voter is compared to the average voter.  Thus, a 
more equitable distribution means more capital for the median voter.  With more 
capital, the median voter selects a lower tax rate that in turn promotes more 
growth.  Both Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) 
substantiate their theories by showing that initial inequality is negatively and 
significantly correlated with growth in a subsequent period.  However, neither 
performs a statistical test to determine whether the specific channel of 
redistribution is how inequality impacts growth. 
 Weak institutions functioning poorly after an external shock is another 
channel through which income inequality is theorized to negatively impact 
subsequent economic growth.  Rodrik (1999) builds a model where two groups 
battle for resources after an external shock.  The two groups are less likely to 
cooperate when they cannot agree on what a “fair” distribution is and also when 
they have more to gain from excluding the other group.  Determining a “fair” 
distribution is more difficult when latent social conflict, of which income 
inequality is a factor, is high.  Excluding the other group is more profitable if the 
society’s institutions are weak (De Soto 2003).  Thus, Rodrik (1999) concludes 
that inequality harms growth by weakening political institutions.  Using three-
stage least squares Easterly et al. (2006) find that all their measures for 
institutional quality are positively correlated to growth and related to both of their 
                                                          
5
 In order to avoid reverse-causation (growth impacting inequality) researchers have used 
inequality at the start of a period to see how it influences subsequent growth in the next 5 or even 
up to 50 years. 
6
 External shocks include a wide variety of factors such as natural disasters and changes in a 
country’s terms of trade. 
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measures for social cohesion7.  They conclude that societies with lower initial 
income inequality have more social cohesion and thus better institutions.  
According to Easterly et al. (2006), countries with solid institutions have longer 
growth spurts due to better handling of external shocks.  The conclusions of 
Rodrik (1999) and Easterly et al. (2006) are supported by Berg et al. (2012) who 
find that external shocks are associated with a higher risk of a growth spell 
ending. 
 Credit-market imperfections are another avenue through which inequality 
is theorized to retard growth.  Benabou (1996) contends that credit constraints 
prevent the poor from investing the optimal amount.  Since there are decreasing 
returns to capital investments, redistributing from the rich (whose marginal 
productivity from investment is relatively low) to the poor (whose marginal 
productivity from investment is relatively high) may enhance productivity and 
economic growth (Benabou 1996).  Aghion et al. (1999) examine more closely 
the incentives of poor borrowers and conclude that inequality also decreases 
borrowers’ incentives.  With limited liability, a poor borrower may suffer from a 
moral hazard problem.  Since the borrower is poor, there is little for them to lose 
if the loan cannot be repaid.  A borrower with a lower level of initial wealth will 
be less motivated to ensure the success of the project compared to a borrower with 
a higher level of initial wealth (Aghion et al. 1999).  Barro (2000) supports the 
credit-market imperfections theory by finding that the effects of inequality on 
growth are negative for poor countries (GDP per capita below $2070) but positive 
for wealthier countries (GDP per capita above $2070).  Since credit-market 
imperfections are more serious in developing countries, greater inequality harms 
growth more in poor countries (Barro 2000; Keefer and Knack 2002). 
 Although the majority of research has found a negative relationship 
between initial income inequality and subsequent economic growth, Banerjee and 
Duflo (2003) find that any change in inequality is associated with a decrease in 
subsequent growth.  They contend that their findings are consistent with the 
theory that redistribution in either direction is costly due to social upheaval.  
However, this theory is given as an explanation to their empirical findings and is 
never tested empirically.  Additionally, Banerjee and Duflo (2003) look at 5 and 
10 year time intervals, while most other research uses longer time intervals of 15 
to 50 years.  Forbes (2000), in contrast to most other studies, finds a positive 
relationship between income inequality and subsequent growth.  A 10-point 
increase in a country’s Gini coefficient is correlated with a 1.3% increase in 
average annual growth over the subsequent 5 year period.  However, Forbes 
                                                          
7
 Easterly et al. (2006) use both the Gini coefficient as well as the share of income going to the 
middle 60% as proxies for income distribution.  Another measure for social cohesion they use is 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization, or the probability that two randomly selected people will not 
belong to the same ethnolinguistic group.  
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(2000) uses a sample with half OECD countries and no countries are from sub-
Saharan Africa.  She acknowledges that her sample is disproportionally wealthy, 
but contrary to Barro (2000), she finds no difference after separating rich and poor 
countries.  Forbes (2000) tentatively supports the theory that there is a trade-off 
between reducing inequality and promoting growth. 
 Corruption awareness is growing and along with it there has been an 
increased interest in the causes and consequences of corruption (Tanzi 1998).  
However, corruption8 by its very nature is not an easy subject to study.  
Corruption can be difficult to quantify because corrupt acts are almost always 
done secretly.  Thus, the most common type of proxies used for corruption are 
subjective indices of how corrupt people think their government is.  Despite the 
challenges, there is a growing body of literature examining the effects of 
corruption on subsequent growth.  Although the studies have unanimously found 
that corruption harms growth, they differ in how corruption harms growth.  Four 
main channels have been proposed for how corruption harms growth: it alters how 
government spends money, harms investments, distorts incentives, and increases 
political instability. 
 Corruption affects the composition of government expenditure because 
corrupt government officials may prefer expenditure that makes it easier to collect 
bribes (Mauro 1997).  Expenditures on grand projects, such as large-scale 
infrastructure, with market values that are difficult to determine, may attract 
corruption.  In health spending, there may be more opportunities for corruption in 
the procurement of hospital buildings and state-of-the-art medical equipment, but 
less opportunity in salaries of doctors and nurses (Mauro 1997).  Using standard 
OLS multiple regression as well as two-stage least squares, Mauro (1997) finds 
that corruption does not impact the overall level of government spending; 
however, it does reduce the amount of spending on education9.  In altering the 
composition of government expenditures, corruption negatively impacts 
bureaucratic efficiency; a corrupt bureaucracy may award service contracts to less 
efficient firms (Jain 2001). 
 Corruption harms investments both internally and externally.  Using both 
OLS and two-stage least squares, Mauro (1995) finds that a one standard 
deviation improvement in corruption increases the investment rate by 4.75% of 
GDP.  This in turn contributes to increasing the annual growth rate by .8 
percentage points.  Besides discouraging investment from internal sources, 
                                                          
8
 Corruption has been defined in several ways.  However, the most widely used and simplest 
definition is the abuse of public power for private benefit (Jain 2001).  Although the corruption 
literature and rent-seeking literature have developed independently, corruption is a form of rent-
seeking. 
9
 This in turn may reduce growth because educational attainment has been shown to be positively 
correlated with growth (Levine and Renelt 1992; Benabou 1996; Barro 2000). 
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corruption also reduces investment from foreigners.  Wei (2000) finds that a one-
grade increase in corruption reduces foreign direct investment by 16%.  With a 
large deviation in the level of corruption among countries, there can be a large 
difference in foreign direct investment due to corruption level.  Wei (2000) 
demonstrates that an increase in the corruption level from that of Singapore 
(which is one of the least corrupt countries) to that of Mexico (which is a highly 
corrupt country) has an equivalent effect on reducing investment as increasing the 
tax rate by 24 percentage points.  Investment is one of the traditional factors 
within the development literature shown to positively impact growth, but 
corruption harms investments. 
 Corruption also harms growth by distorting incentives.  Murphy et al. 
(1993) theorizes that corruption, or more broadly rent-seeking, harms innovators 
because new businesses usually require more import quotas, permits, licenses, and 
other government-supplied “goods”.  Established firms require fewer government 
goods, are likely to be better connected with government officials, and also have 
fewer credit-constraints (Murphy et al. 1993).  Thus, established firms are less 
likely to need to bribe public officials and can do so more easily when needed.  
The negative impact of corruption on new businesses can undermine the 
incentives for entrepreneurs in the long-run.  Corruption over time can lead to 
entrepreneurial talent leaving the productive sector and entering the rent-seeking 
sector (Jain 2001). 
 Another vein through which corruption is thought to negatively impact 
growth is political instability.  Mo (2001) finds that a 1% increase in the 
corruption level reduces the growth rate by .72% with the most important channel 
being political instability.  In his statistical analysis, political instability accounts 
for 53% of the total effect.  Mo (2001) reasons that corruption brings about 
political instability that in turn creates uncertainty over the protection of property 
rights.  Uncertainty concerning property rights then reduces investment and 
economic growth.  However, Wei (2000) points out that corruption and political 
instability causation could run both ways.  Corruption may lead to public 
discontent that eventually topples a government; however, unstable political 
environments may cause officials to have short-term thinking and grab whatever 
rents while they still can (Wei 2000). 
 Corruption and income inequality are both thought to influence growth.  
Most of the literature has developed separately.  However, a few studies do 
mention both income inequality and corruption (Li et al. 2000, Gupta et al. 2002, 
Brempong 2002, Brempong and Camacho 2006).  These studies all find that 
corruption increases income inequality and conclude that income inequality is 
another channel through which corruption harms growth.  These studies all 
assume that income inequality harms growth.  Only Forbes (2000) mentions that 
controlling for corruption may alter the results of studies examining whether 
6
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income inequality harms growth.  However, Forbes (2000) performs no such 
statistical test.          
 This paper contributes to the literature by bridging the gap between the 
separate corruption and income inequality studies.  To the best of my knowledge, 
this is the first study to include corruption and income inequality within the same 
model.  Thus, I am able to determine whether income inequality on its own 
influences subsequent economic growth, or if income inequality only appears to 
influence subsequent economic growth because corruption impacts both income 
inequality and economic growth.   
 
III. Methodology 
 The country is my unit of analysis as I examine between 55 and 126 
countries depending on the model.  The World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/) 
is the primary data source since it is the data source for all variables except 
corruption.  Data for corruption come from Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) (http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/).  
Table 1 displays bivariate correlations as well as means and standard deviations 
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Table 1: Correlation Coefficients and Descriptive Statistics10 
 
GR COR GINI y02 INV OPEN POPG GOV INF HUMAN 
GR 
1.00          
COR 
.386 1.00         
GINI 
-.10 .41 1.00        
y02 
-.46 -.84 -.29 1.00       
INV 
.52 .13 -.28 -.12 1.00 
 
     
OPEN 
.33 -.01 -.31 .05 .49 1.00     
POPG 
-.28 .25 .53 -.34 -.31 -.46 1.00    
GOV 
-.15 -.58 -.38 .47 -.17 .17 -.32 1.00   
INF 
.19 .24 .02 -.21 -.05 .04 -.10 -.05 1.00  
HUM
AN .21 -.36 -.16 .52 .13 .27 -.59 .33 .24 1.00 
Mean 3.19 5.82 45.7 3.42 21.4 39.48 .98 15.3 6.91 91.42 
SD 2.27 2.13 8.48 .64 4.33 16.29 1.17 5.18 9.62 18.51 
n=55 
The bivariate correlations reveal some expected findings as well as 
potential problems.  As expected, there is a relatively strong bivariate correlation 
of .408 between corruption and income inequality.  There is also a positive 
bivariate correlation between corruption and growth.  One explanation for this 
surprising finding is that corruption has a bivariate correlation of -.841 with initial 
level of income11 which has a bivariate correlation with growth of -.463.  These 
                                                          
10
 GR, average GDP per capita growth from 2002-2012; COR, the Corruption Perception Index; 
GINI, the level of income inequality; y02, logged GDP per capita; INV, gross capital formation as 
percentage of GDP; OPEN, imports of goods and services as percentage of GDP; POPG, 
population growth as an annual percent; GOV, government spending as percentage of GDP; INF, 
inflation rate; HUMAN, primary education completion rate. 
11
 The strong bivariate correlation between corruption and initial level of income introduces 
multicollinearity into the model.  This can make it difficult to distinguish the independent effect of 
8
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findings suggest that corrupt countries tend to be poor and poor countries grew 
faster over the time period.  Thus, the negative effect of corruption on growth can 
only be understood by controlling for independent effects through multiple 
regression analysis.  
The dependent variable is the average growth of real GDP per Capita12 
from 2002-2012.  This variable is not normally distributed since it has a skewness 
of 3.615, which is well above the cut-off of 3.  Having normally distributed 
variables, especially the dependent variable, is one of the assumptions of standard 
OLS multiple regression analysis.  In order to normalize the dependent variable, I 
take the logarithm13 of it.  Thus, I display the results with both GDP per Capita 
growth as well as the logged GDP per Capita growth.   
Data limitations are another challenge of this study.  In the full model, I 
include a total of 10 variables while only having 55 observations.  This is a 
violation of a rule of thumb that suggests a minimum number of cases equal to 50 
plus 8 times the number of variables used (Tabachnick and Fidell 2001).  This 
rule of thumb suggests that I should have at least 130 observations for my full 
model.  Although I violate this rule of thumb, it is the norm14 within the 
development literature.  In an attempt to yield more observations, I created a 
dataset to analyze the 2007-2012 time period.  However, I do not perform 
statistical tests with this dataset since it only contains a few more observations, 
has greater skewness, and constitutes a relatively short time period. 
In order to avoid the problem of endogneity, all of the independent 
variables are taken as close to 2002 as possible.  Since many of the explanatory 
variables both influence growth and are influenced by growth, reverse causation 
may plague the results if independent variables are taken after the initial period.  
For example, corruption may decrease growth, but a growing economy may 
decrease corruption by increasing the returns to the productive sector.  Taking 
observations of independent variables from 2002 and using mean GDP per Capita 
growth from 2002-2012 as the dependent variable avoids the problem of reverse 
                                                                                                                                                               
each variable on the dependent variable.  However, since Mo (2001) has a similar bivariate 
correlation and keeps both variables in the model, I do as well. 
12
 The majority of the literature employs GDP per Capita growth; however, since Mo (2001) and 
Brempong (2002) use GDP growth as a dependent variable, I also compiled a dataset with GDP 
growth.  However, since skewness for GDP growth is 3.885 while skewness for GDP per Capita 
growth is 3.615, I only use GDP per Capita growth when performing the statistical tests.  
13
 Since some of the growth rates are negative and logging a negative number is a mathematical 
impossibility, I follow the same procedure as Brempong and Camacho (2006) and add 6 before 
logging.  6 is used since the United Arab Emirates had a negative average growth rate of 5.6%, the 
most negative growth rate of all countries.  
14
 For example, Mo (2001) has a model with 9 variables and 45 observations and Gupta et al. 
(2002) have a model with 11 variables and only 37 observations.  
9
Matti: Corruption, Income Inequality, and Subsequent Economic Growth
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2015
  
causation.  It reveals the impact that initial levels of the independent variables 
have on subsequent economic growth.  
The two key independent variables under consideration are corruption and 
income inequality.  Both variables, however, have data limitations.  Corruption is 
inherently difficult to measure since most corrupt acts are illegal (Jain 2001).  
Thus, I rely on perception of corruption rather than an objective measure.  Using 
the perception of corruption could pose a validity problem if perceptions differ 
from reality.  However, due to the difficulty in objectively measuring corruption, 
using perceptions is the norm within the corruption literature.  Transparency 
International combines the results of numerous surveys to build an index for how 
corrupt people perceive their government to be.  A score of 10 indicates no 
corruption while a score of 0 indicates complete corruption.  In order to make 
interpretation more natural, I follow the same procedure as Wei (2000) and Li et 
al. (2000) by taking 10 minus the Corruption Perception Index.  Thus, a higher 
score now represents a higher level of corruption. 
For income inequality, I use the Gini coefficient taken from the World 
Bank.  The Gini index ranges from 0 to 100 with a score of 0 representing perfect 
equality and 100 representing perfect inequality.  Since there is a high cost of 
administering enough surveys to compile the Gini coefficient, data are not 
available each year for every country in the sample.  Only 49 countries have a 
Gini index for 2002, but I am able to expand to 88 cases by including Gini data 
from 2000 and 2001.  Besides the quantity of Gini coefficients available, another 
concern is quality.  It is important for the data to be representative of the country 
as a whole.  Therefore, I drop all cases where the index is compiled from urban or 
rural residents only15.  Additionally, surveys in some countries are expenditure-
based while others are income-based.  Due to consumption smoothing, a person’s 
expenditure varies less over their lifetime than their income (Deininger and Squire 
1996).  Thus, using expenditure-based data would understate inequality.  
Deininger and Squire (1996) find that, on average, expenditure-based coefficients 
are 6.6 points less than income-based coefficients.  I follow the procedure 
developed by Deininger and Squire (1996) and used in Li and Zou (1998), Forbes 
(2000), Keefer and Knack (2002), and Banerjee and Duflo (2003) and add 6.6 to 
all expenditure-based coefficients. 
Initial level of GDP per Capita is a critical control variable used 
throughout the literature.  Initial level of GDP per Capita is theorized to be 
negatively correlated with subsequent economic growth.  In the neoclassical 
growth model, since capital deepening faces diminishing returns, convergence 
occurs (all else equal) as poor countries “catch up” to rich countries over time 
(Solow 1956).  In the literature surveyed, the initial level of GDP per Capita is 
                                                          
15
 For example, Argentina is dropped from the sample because the index is compiled only from 
surveys given to urban residents. 
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consistently negatively correlated with subsequent economic growth.  However, 
with the exception of Alesina and Rodrik (1994), the variable is always logged.  
Since the skewness for initial GDP per Capita in my sample is 5.9, I also logged 
it.    
Investment is theorized to increase economic growth because investment 
increases capital accumulation and thus productivity.  Levine and Renelt (1992) 
perform sensitivity analysis to show that investment is one of the few variables in 
the development literature that remains statistically significant across different 
time periods, specifications, and models.  Although a variety of variables have 
been used to proxy investment, I use gross domestic investment as a percentage of 
GDP. 
Trade is one of the oldest variables theorized to promote growth.  Adam 
Smith argued that trade with other nations allows for greater specialization as the 
market expands.  This greater specialization fosters economies of scale and higher 
productivity.  David Ricardo established a theory of trade based on comparative 
advantage where trade allows countries to consume more than they could under a 
condition of autarky.  Trade is especially important to the literature linking 
income inequality with subsequent economic growth because trade is theorized16 
to decrease inequality in poor countries but increase inequality in rich countries 
(Barro 2000).  Although different studies have used either exports, imports, or 
exports plus imports as proxies for openness to trade, Levine and Renelt (1992) 
find no difference between the three proxies17.  Thus, I use the World Bank data 
for imports as a percentage of GDP. 
Although economists have identified the effects of population growth to 
be ambiguous with respect to economic growth, it is still a widely used control 
variable (Levine and Renelt 1992).  On the one hand, a growing population can 
make it more difficult to increase GDP per Capita since population growth 
increases the denominator in the GDP per Capita equation.  However, population 
growth can serve as a proxy for growth in the labor force, and a growing labor 
force may be more productive by taking advantage of economies of scale (Mo 
2001).  Despite its ambiguous effects on growth, population growth can still alter 
the results of statistical tests relating inequality and growth.  For example, using 
fertility as a similar variable to population growth, Barro (2000) finds that income 
inequality has no significant effect on subsequent economic growth, but omitting 
                                                          
16
 This is a restatement of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem (Stolper and Samuelson 1941).  
However, this theorem has not been borne out by subsequent empirical tests. 
17
 This finding is expected since exports are simply the payments for imports (Lerner 1936).  
According to the Lerner Symmetry Theorem, the value of imported goods equals the value of 
exported goods. 
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fertility yields a statistically significant negative relationship.  Thus, I include 
population growth18 as a control variable. 
Size of government is theorized to negatively impact growth because a 
larger government may crowd-out some of the growth-promoting effects of the 
market.  Even if the government spends efficiently, there is still the risk that 
government growth-promoting policies may ultimately harm growth because of 
distortionary taxes (Levine and Renelt 1992).  Thus, I use general government 
final consumption expenditure (percent of GDP) as a measure of the size of 
government.  This includes all government expenditures for goods and services.  
Inflation is another classic variable in the development literature theorized 
to harm growth.  Inflation, regardless of how it is measured, has consistently been 
shown to harm growth (Levine and Renelt 1992).  Inflation may be especially 
important in the literature examining the effects of inequality on subsequent 
growth because inflation increases inequality (Li and Zou 2002).  Thus, I use 
inflation as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP deflator.  This 
measure shows the rate of price change in the economy as a whole. 
Just as greater human capital makes an individual worker more 
productive, higher levels of human capital in a country as a whole, make the 
country more productive (Mincer 1984).  Human capital as the source of new 
knowledge and technology can help shift the production function upward and 
break through the steady state implied by the neoclassical growth model.  
Although human capital development can occur outside of formal education 
(Mincer 1984), different measures for a country’s level of education are common 
proxies for human capital.  Thus, I include primary school completion rate as a 
proxy for human capital.  Although this variable accounts for the quantity of 
formal education, it cannot control for the quality of education.  However, in the 
regressions performed by Levine and Renelt (1992), variables for the quality of 
education, such as literacy rates, yield similar results. 
This study employs standard OLS multiple regression analysis expressed 
in the following reduced-form theoretical model: 
 
(1)         	
                   
where    is the predicted average real GDP per Capita growth rate in country i , b 
is a partial slope measuring the impact that each term has on   ,  is a measure of 
corruption in country i, 
 is an income inequality measure,  represents current 
levels of economic well-being,  is a set of indicators for the openness of an 
                                                          
18
 Population growth is defined by the World Bank as the exponential rate of growth of midyear 
population between two years. 
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economy,  contains demographic control variables,  reflects government-
related variables, and  is an error term accounting for omitted variable bias.   
The hypothesis that the relationship between initial income inequality and 
subsequent economic growth is overstated because corruption decreases 
subsequent economic growth and increases income inequality is difficult to test.  
It requires careful selection and interpretation of different models.  I start with a 
model where there is a statistically significant negative relationship between 
income inequality and subsequent growth.  If inequality is no longer statistically 
significant or its coefficient is greatly reduced after adding corruption to the 
model, then I would tentatively support the hypothesis.  If corruption is added and 
inequality maintains its statistical significance and magnitude on its coefficient, 
then the hypothesis would be rejected19. 
 In order to make comparisons with the existing literature, it is important to 
make as few changes to previous regressions as possible.  Ideally, this would 
mean replicating the results of a previous income inequality study and then simply 
adding corruption.  Unfortunately, due to data limitations, I am unable to use the 
same time period as previous studies.  However, I am able to closely match the 
variables used in both Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini 
(1994).  My Model 7 matches Models 1, 9, and 10 for Alesina and Rodrik (1994) 
except they do not log initial GDP per Capita, and they use primary school 
attendance rates rather than completion rates.  My Model 7 also matches Model 
(i) for Persson and Tabellini (1994) except they use primary school attendance 
rates rather than completion rates and the size of the middle quintile for inequality 
instead of the Gini coefficient.  Although these models constitute a different time 
period than my Model 7, the signs on the coefficients are consistent. 
 The reduced-form theoretical model can be expanded into a fully 
developed empirical model.  Taking each of the variables described above and 
inserting them in as separate terms yields the following equation for average GDP 
per capita growth from 2002-2012 for country i: 
 
(2)         	   02         
                              !"#$%  &  '(  ℮ 
                                                          
19
 This statistical procedure and interpretation is similar to that used in Perotti (1996).  After 
finding inequality to be statistically significant and negatively impacting growth, Perotti (1996) 
analyzes urbanization as a possible omitted variable.  Urbanization may increase both economic 
growth and inequality.  However, after adding in urbanization it is statistically insignificant and 
the coefficient for inequality is unchanged.  Thus, Perotti (1996) concludes that urbanization is not 
an omitted variable. 
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Where   is the mean GDP per capita growth for country i from 2002-2012, 
COR is the modified Corruption Perception Index for 2002,  is the Gini 
coefficient for years 2000, 2001, and 2002, 02 is the logged GDP per capita for 
2002,  is gross domestic investment as a percentage of GDP in 2002,   
is imports as a percentage of GDP for 2002,  is the rate of growth of 
midyear population between the years 2001 and 2002, "#$% is the primary 
school completion rate for 2002,  is the general government final 
consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP for 2002, ( is the annual 
growth rate of the GDP deflator for 2002, and ℮ is an error term.  
                 
IV. Findings / Observations 
Tables 2 and 3, listed below, detail the results of the different regression 
models20.  Ten separate models are included with the first model containing all the 
variables, Model 7 matching the models in Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and 
Persson and Tabellini (1994), and Model 8 adding corruption. I report 
unstandardized and standardized coefficients (in parenthesis), significance levels, 
r
2
 values, and, in the bottom row, the number of observations.  The 
unstandardized coefficient21 is the partial slope of the regression plane.  It gives 
the amount of change in the dependent variable from a one-unit change in the 
independent variable22, all else constant.  The standardized coefficients make use 
of a conversion to standard units, z-scores, and thus reflect the number of standard 
deviations the dependent variable will change from a standard deviation change in 
the independent variable.  The r2 value in each model is the percentage of 
variation in the dependent variable that can be explained by the variance in all the 









                                                          
20
 Models 11-20 are in Appendix A and display the results with logged average GDP per Capita 
growth 2002-2012 as the dependent variable.   Despite the problem of skewness, the results are 
similar to those in Models 1-10. 
21
 For example, in Model 1 an increase in the corruption index by a unit of 1 decreases the average 
annual GDP per Capita growth rate by .167 percentage points, all else equal.  
22
 However, since initial GDP per Capita is logged, the simple conversion does not work for this 
independent variable. 
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Table 2: Models 1-5.  Dependent Variable: Average GDP per Capita Growth 
2002-2012 
























































    




















R Square .663 .635 .594 .591 .441 
Observations 55 71 65 72 126 
Significance Measures:     
• *p < .10 (90% confidence level) 
• **p < .05 (95% confidence level) 
• ***p < .01 (99% confidence level) 
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Table 3: Models 6-10.  Dependent Variable: Average GDP per Capita 
Growth 2002-2012 
Variable Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
































    
Government 
Spending  
     














R Square .385 .507 .552 .458 .552 
Observations 134 68 56 73 66 
Significance Measures:     
• *p < .10 (90% confidence level) 
• **p < .05 (95% confidence level) 
• ***p < .01 (99% confidence level) 
Standardized partial coefficients are in parentheses 
 
The results of this study contain some expected findings, some unexpected 
findings, and a lack of support to confirm the hypothesis.  As expected, level of 
investment and primary completion rate are both positively and significantly 
correlated with subsequent economic growth.  Additionally, initial level of GDP 
per Capita has a large negative correlation with subsequent growth and is 
statistically significant at the 99% confidence level in every model.  Population 
growth consistently has a negative coefficient; however, it is only statistically 
significant in roughly half the models.   
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Surprisingly, openness to trade, inflation rate, and government spending 
are never close to being statistically significant and have almost no effect on 
subsequent growth.  Perhaps openness to trade is influenced by the Great 
Recession.  Countries that are less interconnected may not have been influenced 
as much by contractions in other countries.  However, the empirical link between 
openness to trade and susceptibility to external shocks is unclear.  Easterly et al. 
(2001) find that openness to trade is associated with increased volatility in per 
capita growth rates while Cavallo and Frankel (2008) find that openness to trade 
decreases a country’s chances of experiencing a recession due to external shocks. 
Inflation may be a weak variable in my models because of the relatively 
short time period of 10 years under consideration.  In the short-run, inflation may 
lower nominal interest rates.  These lower interest rates may encourage 
investments into asset bubbles such as real-estate and the stock market.  The 
economy appears to be growing in the short-run, and the negative effects of 
inflation may occur outside of a 10-year time frame.   
Level of government spending may be showing a neutral effect on 
subsequent economic growth because the composition of government spending 
may matter more than the magnitude.  Governments may provide growth-
promoting public goods, or they might spend money on redistribution programs 
that harm growth (Levine and Renelt 1992).  In some cases, government spending 
and market activities may be complements.  For example, government financed 
infrastructure may promote growth by widening the extent of the market.  
Additionally, the negative effects of a high level of government spending may 
take longer than 10 years to develop.  In the short-run, a government may be able 
to avoid growth-retarding tax increases by financing part of its spending through 
borrowing.  The negative side-effects of borrowing may occur outside of a 10-
year time horizon.   
Corruption enters in with the expected sign in every model, but it is never 
statistically significant.  However, its magnitude is fairly large in some models.  
For example, in Model 4, a 1 unit change in the corruption index is associated 
with a .193 percentage point decrease in annual GDP per Capita growth.  To put 
this into perspective, if Bangladesh (the most corrupt country in the sample) were 
to reduce its corruption to the level in Finland (the least corrupt country), the 
model indicates that Bangladesh would increase its growth rate by 1.64 
percentage points23 (all else equal).  Corruption also appears to have a nontrivial 
impact on the explanatory power of the models; removing corruption between 
Models 4 and 5 reduces the R Square from .591 to .441.  Therefore, the findings 
                                                          
23
 The increase in the growth rate by 1.64 percentage points may appear small, but small 
differences in growth rates have a large impact in the long-run.  For example, a country growing at 
1% per year doubles every 70 years, but a country growing at 2.64% each year doubles every 43 
years. 
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suggest that corruption has a sizable negative impact on growth, but this effect is 
not statistically significant.   
There are a few possible reasons for this finding that relate to the quality 
of the corruption data.  There is the possibility of a validity problem as the 
perception of corruption and the actual level of corruption may differ in some 
important way.  For example, cultural norms in Africa may make the perception 
of corruption different than in other regions (Brempong 2002).  Additionally, 
different types of corruption are not revealed by people’s perception of 
corruption.  Decentralized forms of corruption may be more harmful than 
centralized forms (Brempong and Camacho 2006).  If there is no coordination 
between different public officials demanding bribes throughout a lengthy process 
such as securing a deed to property, then no individual public official can be held 
accountable for the success or failure of securing the deed.  However, in a 
centralized system, public officials accepting a bribe can be held accountable.  
Thus, they will be more likely to ensure that the service is provided quickly 
(Brempong and Camacho 2006). 
Income inequality has a negative coefficient across all models, but this 
effect is only statistically significant in the simplified models.  The impact of 
inequality on subsequent growth is fairly large in the models where it is 
statistically significant.  For example, in Model 7, increasing a country’s Gini 
coefficient by a unit of 1, decreases subsequent growth by .064 percentage points 
each year.  To put this into perspective, if Angola (the least equal country) 
reduced its inequality to the level of Sweden (the most equal country), the model 
indicates that Angola would increase its growth rate by 2.35 percentage points (all 
else equal). 
The theory under consideration is that the negative relationship between 
initial levels of income inequality and subsequent growth is partly spurious 
because corruption decreases growth and increases inequality.  However, there is 
no evidence from the statistical tests that this theory is valid.  In Model 7, 
inequality has an unstandardized coefficient of -.064, standardized coefficient of -
.229, and is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.  After adding 
corruption in with Model 8, the confidence level for inequality remains the same 
and the magnitude of the relationship actually increases slightly with an 
unstandardized coefficient of -.070 and standardized coefficient of -.258 for 
inequality.  This is the exact opposite effect than what the theory would suggest24.  
Additionally, corruption is not statistically significant.  These models suggest that 
inequality negatively impacts growth even after controlling for corruption.     
 
 
                                                          
24
 The same result can be observed in Appendix A with Models 17 and 18. 
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 Using standard OLS multiple regression analysis, this study confirms the 
relationship between several factors and subsequent growth.  However, this study 
does not find support for the theory that the relationship between inequality and 
subsequent growth is partly spurious due to corruption as an intervening variable.  
In fact, the observed effect of corruption on inequality is opposite of what the 
theory would suggest.  Even though the hypothesis is rejected, this study still adds 
to the literature by eliminating a possible intervening variable in the relationship 
between inequality and growth.  Additionally, it confirms the relationship 
between initial levels of GDP per Capita, investment, and level of human capital 
in a shorter and more recent time period than most studies. 
 This study, however, suffers from numerous weaknesses.  Given the 
number of observations available, most models include more variables than are 
appropriate in multiple regression analysis.  Additionally, the variables included 
do not fully match the variables included in the previous studies that I try to 
replicate.  This study also differs from these prior studies because it uses a shorter 
and more recent time period.  With a longer time period, the effect of inequality 
on growth may be different (Banerjee and Duflo 2003).  Additionally, the key 
explanatory variable in my theory, corruption, is based on perceptions and is 
never statistically significant. 
 Due to the limitations of this study and the difficulties of empirical work 
in development economics as a whole, policy recommendations must be made 
cautiously.  Just because a variable is shown to impact growth in a model does not 
mean that increasing or decreasing the variable makes for good public policy.  For 
example, the initial level of GDP per Capita has a highly statistically significant 
negative relationship with subsequent economic growth.  However, a growth 
policy advocating for an initial reduction in GDP in order to increase subsequent 
growth would be an absurd and self-defeating policy.   
Even though this study finds a negative relationship between inequality 
and growth, the best policy for growth may not be redistribution.  In the literature, 
some studies recommend redistribution on efficiency grounds (Aghion et al. 
1999; Keefer and Knack 2002), but the majority of researchers recognize the 
adverse effects that redistribution can have on incentives.  Although the results of 
the statistical tests suggest that there is no trade-off between equity and efficiency, 
the costs of redistribution may still exceed the benefits of a more equal society. 
 Although corruption is never statistically significant in any model, the size 
of its negative effects is substantial.  Thus, policies that reduce corruption may 
encourage growth.  However, the optimum level of corruption is not zero since 
there are costs associated with reducing corruption.  The optimal level of 
corruption occurs where the marginal social costs of reducing corruption further 
equal the marginal social benefits of that reduction (Tanzi 1998).  Since 
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reductions in corruption are subject to diminishing returns (Brempong and 
Camacho 2006), countries that are highly corrupt may benefit from a development 
strategy focused on reducing corruption while countries that have little corruption 
would likely not benefit as much from a similar strategy. 
 The relationship between primary completion rate and subsequent 
economic growth is positive and highly statistically significant in almost every 
model.  However, this does not mean that a simple public policy such as 
increasing government spending on primary education would automatically foster 
growth.  For example, Levine and Renelt (1992) find that enrollment rates are 
positively and significantly correlated with subsequent growth, but government 
education expenditures are not.  This finding suggests that the quality and 
quantity of education are not wholly dependent on the level of education 
spending.  Additionally, since there are decreasing returns to education (Aghion et 
al. 1999), countries with different initial levels of education may yield different 
results from a policy encouraging more education.  It is also important to keep in 
mind that primary completion rates are serving as a proxy for human capital, and 
there are avenues to increase human capital outside of education. 
 Even though my models show little relationship between openness to 
trade, the inflation rate, and subsequent growth, it does not necessarily mean these 
factors are unimportant.  Due to the challenges of empirical analysis in 
development economics, the significance of variables can be sensitive to different 
control variables, specification, statistical technique, and time period.  It is not 
possible to perfectly determine what causes growth.  Therefore, it is especially 
important from a public policy perspective to ascertain what variables have an 
important role (significant across many studies) and what variables have little role 
(rarely significant) (Durlauf et al. 2005).  Since economic growth is brought about 
by a complicated interaction of numerous variables, there is no single correct 
solution for achieving faster growth. 
 Given the complexity of the factors influencing economic growth, there 
are several avenues for subsequent research.  Data limitations have been a major 
concern in prior studies as well as in this one.  Subsequent research would be 
aided by larger data sets that are already standardized.  This would also better 
allow researchers to replicate findings before testing a new theory since results 
can vary if models differ in time period and specification of variables (Levine and 
Renelt 1992).  In the inequality literature, there is consistently a negative 
relationship between inequality and subsequent growth.  However, the avenues 
through which inequality harms growth have been largely untested.  Additionally, 
when some of the avenues, such as the demand for more redistribution, have been 
empirically tested, they are not borne out by the data (Perotti 1996).  Future 
research should go beyond establishing a negative relationship between inequality 
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and subsequent growth and test the channels through which inequality may harm 
growth. 
 Given that few of the channels have been tested empirically, it is also 
important for future work to continue to test the validity of the relationship 
between inequality and growth.  It is especially important to test for omitted 
variables that may reveal the relationship to be spurious.  For example, lack of 
property rights and a stable rule of law decrease economic growth by making 
capital dead and increase inequality by restricting the poor’s access to legal 
institutions (De Soto 2003).  Thus, it may not really be income inequality that 
harms growth, but lack of property rights and a stable rule of law that decrease 
growth and increase inequality25.  However, there could be other variables that 
may strengthen the negative effect of inequality on growth.  For example, if labor 
market flexibility is positively correlated with growth and positively correlated 
with inequality, then controlling for labor market flexibility may increase the 
coefficient for inequality. 
This study does not find support for the hypothesis that the relationship 
between inequality and subsequent growth is partly spurious due to corruption as 
an intervening variable.  The observed effect of corruption on inequality is 
opposite of what the hypothesis would suggest.  Additionally, some factors 
theorized to influence growth such as inflation, openness to trade, and size of 
government have little impact.  However, this study does confirm several factors 
such as initial level of GDP per Capita, investment level, and primary completion 
rates as being important for growth.  The results of this study suggest that, 
although one of the oldest questions in economics, what causes growth is still 








                                                          
25
 Evidence for this effect may already exist.  After adding a property rights index, Keefer and 
Knack (2002) find that the coefficient for income inequality is halved and no longer statistically 
significant.  Additionally, the property rights index is statistically significant at the 95% 
confidence level and the R Square almost doubles.  Keefer and Knack (2002) see this finding as a 
confirmation of their theory that inequality reduces growth mainly by harming property rights.  
However, they never test the direction of the relationship.  I attempted to replicate the results of 
this study testing first with the overall score for the Economic Freedom Index in 2002 and then 
with the subcomponent for property rights.  However, both variables behave like the corruption 
variable as they are statistically insignificant and have no discernable effect on the income 
inequality variable. 
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Appendix A: Models with the Alternative Dependent Variable 
 
Table 4: Models 11-15.  Dependent Variable: Logged Average GDP per Capita 
Growth 2002-2012 
























































    



















R Square .682 .648 .610 .595 .437 
Observations 55 71 65 72 126 
Significance Measures:     
• *p < .10 (90% confidence level) 
• **p < .05 (95% confidence level) 
• ***p < .01 (99% confidence level) 







Matti: Corruption, Income Inequality, and Subsequent Economic Growth
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2015
  
Table 5: Models 16-18.  Dependent Variable: Logged Average GDP per Capita 
Growth 2002-2012 
Variable Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 





































     













R Square .381 .525 .574 .475 .560 
Observations 134 68 56 73 66 
 
Significance Measures:     
• *p < .10 (90% confidence level) 
• **p < .05 (95% confidence level) 
• ***p < .01 (99% confidence level) 
Standardized partial coefficients are in parentheses 
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